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Abstract 
 
Health information exchange (HIE) is expected to 
improve the quality and cost of healthcare but 
sustained use of HIE by providers has been difficult to 
achieve.  A number of factors play a role in that 
process including concern for the security and privacy 
of the exchanged information.  This tension between 
the expected benefits of HIE resulting from 
collaboration and information sharing on the one 
hand, and the potential security risks inherent in the 
exchange process on the other hand, is not well 
understood.  We propose an information security 
control theory to explain this tension. We evaluate this 
theory through a case study of the iterative 
development of the information security policy for an 
HIE in the western United States. We find that the 
theory offers a good framework through which to 
understand the information security policy 
development process.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
The digital transformation of healthcare is 
expected to improve care quality and reduce the costs 
of providing quality care [6].  An important element of 
that process is interoperability (i.e., the ability of 
healthcare organizations to digitally exchange 
information). The National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology asserts that, “interoperability 
is necessary for a “learning health system” in which 
health information flows seamlessly and is available to 
the right people, at the right place, at the right time” 
[1]. The value of interoperability has been recognized 
for some time with the development of community 
health management information systems (CHMISs) in 
the early to mid-1990’s, community health 
information networks (CHINs) in the mid to late 
1990’s, and regional health information organizations 
(RHIOs) in the 2000’s [34].  More recently, the 2009 
HITECH Act included nearly $550 million in federal 
funding for the development of Health Information 
Exchanges (HIEs) in every state and U.S. territory.  
However, the limited success of these initiatives 
demonstrates that the route to effective and sustained 
interoperability is multi-faceted and insufficiently 
understood [13]. 
One of the main challenges for interoperability is 
maintaining the security and privacy of the protected 
health information that is transmitted through the HIE 
[13, 37].  According to the Identity Theft Resource 
Center, in 2015, the healthcare sector experienced 
more than one third of all publicly reported data 
breaches [20]. Security breaches can have serious 
consequences, not only for patients, through identity 
theft or disclosure of private health records, but also 
for the healthcare organizations that stand to be 
impacted financially, through loss of reputation, trust, 
and potential legal and regulatory consequences. 
Threats to the security of health data are expected to 
remain high because of the value of medical records 
on the black market [2].  Unfortunately, the 
information systems in healthcare organizations are 
often not very robust when it comes to security.  
Hospitals, such as Hollywood Presbyterian and 
Kansas Heart proved highly vulnerable to a 2016 spate 
of ransomware attacks.  In at least one case where a 
ransom was paid, the attackers only partly restored 
hospital data, demanding further ransom [31]. 
A tension, therefore, exists between the expected 
value of facilitating interoperability and the potential 
threat of security breaches, since the information 
exchange process could expose patients and providers 
to significant harm.  Security controls must be 
sufficient to protect the data, but not restrictive to the 
point that they impede interoperability.  Creating and 
sustaining an effective security program is essential to 
the achievement of the goal of balancing security and 
interoperability. A good security program starts with 
the development of an information security policy 
[36].  While an information security policy is 
prescribed by many as an essential component of an 
effective security program, there is little research on 
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the factors that go into developing that policy, and 
even less on the impact that the aforementioned 
tension plays in the policy development process. 
Therefore, an important research question for 
understanding and explaining what enables health 
information exchange is, how does the essential 
tension between sharing and protecting health data 
impact the development of information security 
policies?   
This research answers that question by proposing a 
theoretical framework that provides a mechanism for 
balancing the tension between sharing and protecting 
information. We evaluate the framework by 
investigating how an HIE in the western United States 
addressed the tension, between protecting and sharing 
health data, in the development of their information 
security policies.  We investigate the HIE’s iterative 
policy development process through the theoretical 
lens of security controls reasoning and find that the 
framework is helpful in understanding and developing 
information security policies to support the HIE’s goal 
of interoperability, while maintaining the privacy and 
security of the information managed by the exchange. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
Fundamental goals for information security 
include the confidentiality, availability, and integrity 
of data and the development of controls to support 
those goals [14, 3].  However, much of the published 
research on information security is limited in its 
consideration of the theoretical foundations that 
underpin it, and that which does typically makes use 
of theories that are applicable to a very limited range 
of the information security spectrum [30].  For 
example, economic theories (i.e., return on 
investment, internal rate of return, etc.) have been used 
to explain the financial value of controls and how that 
valuation is used to prioritize the decisions to 
implement those controls [15]; while general 
deterrence theory (GDT) has been used to explain 
human behavior and the design of controls to combat 
computer crime and intentional abuse [33].  Global 
theories that could broadly explain a wide range of 
phenomena in information security are lacking either 
because they are not highly valued or because 
information security scholars have tended to focus on 
very specific phenomena in their research.  In addition, 
there is a general disconnect between information 
security research that engages in security theory 
development and empirical information security 
papers [30]. This research aims to address these gaps 
in the literature by proposing a theoretical framework 
specific to information security, but one that is broadly 
applicable to a variety of security phenomena, and 
assessing that framework through an empirical 
investigation thus addressing both rigor and relevance. 
The essential tension identified in our study 
suggests forms of reasoning that are neither financial 
nor deterrent.  Rather, it is a tension between sharing 
and protecting data.  Sharing involves reasoning with 
an aim to expose sensitive data to outsiders (i.e., other 
individuals or organizations). On the other hand, 
protecting data is reasoning with an aim to seclude the 
data.  Decision settings where there may be multiple, 
conflicting aims and multiple forms of reasoning have 
been noted in prior literature in decision analysis [22], 
healthcare [16], education [28], etc. The purpose of 
this research is not to replicate prior research in multi-
objective decision analysis, but rather, to explore the 
two essential, conflicting objectives in the context of 
information sharing and information security. This is 
important because these conflicting objectives are 
unique to information security, especially in 
healthcare settings, where sharing of information can 
provide enormous benefits, while also creating the 
burden of information protection. 
This research proposes that these conflicting 
objectives incorporate two interrelated forms of 
security reasoning: exposure control reasoning and 
ethical control reasoning.  The theory is based on the 
premise that the decision to enact controls to protect 
information systems is a fundamental and meaningful 
outcome of setting information security policies.  
Therefore, the decision to adopt an information 
security policy is an effective place to begin a search 
for explanations of otherwise unexplained information 
security behaviors.  Exposure and ethics are chosen as 
the two anchors of controls policy reasoning because 
both concepts are prevalent and persistent in the 
information security literature [23, 11].  These two 
forms of control reasoning are often treated separately, 
although in most settings they combine to explain how 
decision makers decide between which controls to set 
into policy, and which ones to forego, because the 
controls are too difficult or expensive to acquire or 
operate. 
 
2.1 Exposure control reasoning 
 
Exposure control reasoning is based on the fact 
that information assets (e.g., end-user devices, servers, 
networks, etc.) are inherently exposed to threats (e.g., 
human error, hackers, fires, etc.) Threat exposure 
includes threats of any potential exposure, disclosure, 
breach of confidentiality, or any form of risk 
exposures that may arise from external threat sources, 
or, insider threats.  Exposure control reasoning aims to 
manage those risk exposures [8, 29]  through the 
3639
  
identification and placement of controls between 
assets and threats.  However, this process is complex 
and challenging because assets and threats may be 
linked to each other in a multitude of ways.  
Consequently, the addition of security requirements 
and controls into an information system can be 
expected to meaningfully increase the cost and 
complexity of the system and its operation.  This is 
why information security researchers and practitioners 
must focus on both, the analysis of assets, and the 
analysis of threats. Therefore, exposure control 
reasoning is an important component of many 
formalized approaches to information security. 
One form of exposure control reasoning is 
represented in Figure 1.  This figure represents an 
insecure system with the set of an organization’s 
information assets (A) in relation to a set of 
information threats (T).  The arrows represent edges 
between the members of each set.  In this case, the 
edges (T-A) are exposures [17]. 
 
Figure 1.  Threat-asset exposure edges (adapted 
from Hoffman et al [17]) 
 
Exposure control reasoning aims to control such 
exposures by creating a set of controls (C) that protect 
organizational assets from security exposures.  Each 
control is inserted to eliminate the edges between 
threats and assets. The aim is to replace each T-A edge 
with a T-C edge and a C-A edge.  See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Threat-control-asset edges (adapted 
from Hoffman et al [17]) 
 
2.2 Ethical control reasoning 
 
Ethical control reasoning arises in the need to make 
rational decisions about controls adoption.  These 
decisions rely on ethical reasoning because sometimes 
controls are unavailable or too costly in relationship to 
the likelihood of threats and the value of assets.  
Ethical controls reasoning can take a number of forms, 
but the most common are utilitarian and deontological 
reasoning.  Utilitarian reasoning focuses on achieving 
the greatest good and relies on risk analysis to 
determine the degree of hazard to important 
stakeholders [10].  Virtually all security design 
methodologies adopt some form of risk analysis as a 
central activity for determining whether a control is 
justified.  Alternatively, deontological reasoning 
focuses on the moral duty of adherence to rules, and is 
used as the basis for compliance with laws and 
regulations [10].  For example, HIE privacy and 
security controls are currently governed by the 2013 
HIPAA Final Rule. 
One prevalent form of ethical control reasoning is 
the typical risk treatment framework, for example 
Jones & Ashenden [21].  Such frameworks map risk 
treatments (controls) into categories suitable for 
different values of threat frequency and threat impact.  
(See Figure 3.)  High frequency, low impact threats are 
given different treatments than low frequency, high 
impact threats, etc.  Such treatment decisions are 
essentially a form of utilitarian ethical reasoning.  
Control treatments are enacted where they do the 
greatest good, and not where they do little good. For 
example, the risk of vandalism by an external hacker 
is a form of risk that can be high in frequency, but low 
in impact.  The implementation of common self-
protection mechanisms such as firewalls and VPN 
access for external users is an effective response to that 
threat, while cutting off all access from outside the 
organization will have little additional benefit while 
significantly impeding legitimate work.  The goal is 
not to eliminate risk but rather to shift it down and to 
the left within the framework without enacting 
controls that are more impediment than benefit. 
 
Figure 3.  Risk treatment framework (adapted 
from Jones & Ashenden [21]) 
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2.3 Formulating policies 
 
Exposure control reasoning and ethical control 
reasoning interact with each other in the formulation 
of information security policies.  The creation of 
information security policies is a fundamental action 
in information security as it provides the basis for an 
organization’s approach to information security and is 
the foundational document by which procedures and 
controls are selected and implemented [4, 12]. 
Therefore, the application of both exposure and ethical 
controls reasoning in the development of an 
information security policy is essential to create a 
policy that takes into account, the assets and threats for 
which security controls must be implemented, the 
needs of relevant stakeholders, and the requirements 
of requisite laws and regulations, to enable both the 
sharing and protection of information. 
Research has considered the role [18], importance 
[35], structure [4], and content [12] of the information 
security policy, but none have directly addressed the 
essential tension between the need to both share and 
protect information that is fundamental to 
organizations like an HIE.  Our theoretical model 
addresses that tension and we apply the model to an 
HIE to understand how the tension is managed through 
the information security policy development process 
in such an organization. 
 
2.4 The essential tension 
 
In formulating and applying security policies for 
an HIE, the policy developers have to balance the 
requirements of ensuring interoperability and 
availability of information to authorized parties, while 
at the same time ensuring confidentiality, integrity and 
overall security. For controlling the threat of any kind 
of malicious or accidental exposure of information that 
may result in a security breach, including breach of 
confidentiality, policy makers can adopt exposure 
control reasoning. Similarly, they can use ethical 
control reasoning to rationalize the decisions on the 
appropriate level of controls. However, these two 
forms of reasoning must be balanced to both enable 
the sharing of information and protecting that 
information. Thus, exposure and ethical controls 
reasoning, correspond to the tension between the aims 
of “sharing” and “protection” in creating an HIE 
security policy.  Exposure control reasoning aims to 
develop complete security and privacy, creating a path 
to ensure we protect everything.  It offers a 
mathematical frame that is verifiably complete and 
secure.  Ethical control reasoning, in contrast, aims to 
make rational decisions about what not to protect.  It 
assumes that a fully protected system is expensive and 
morally unreasonable.  It accepts there are trade-offs 
in security, such as the tradeoff between complete 
security and complete interoperability.  It guides the 
reasoning across a threshold where some exposures 
are acceptable.  The occurrence of these risks is 
acceptable because such events can be insured, or they 
are inexpensive, or they are avoidable in operation, or 
safeguards are sufficiently effective.   
Our identification of this theoretical tension is not 
intended as a normative substitute for existing theories 
and methods of multi-criteria decision making.  
Rather, this tension helps explicate the knowledge and 
preferences of the decision maker [19] that is a 
necessary input to multi-criteria decisions.  It offers a 
clear frame for illuminating the contradictory inputs to 
the decision process. Normatively, multi-criteria 
decision theories, such as Multiple Attribute Utility 
Theory [5, 22] or the Analytical Hierarchy Process, 
can then be employed for the decision-making process 
itself [27]. 
 
3. Case study 
 
A qualitative case study was utilized to evaluate an 
HIE’s information security policy development 
process.  The HIE in this study, which shall henceforth 
be known as WesternHIE, is located in the western 
United States and includes participating healthcare 
organizations across the entire state in which it 
operates.  The HIE was initially formed in 2011 and 
continues to operate successfully experiencing growth 
with 89 healthcare organizations currently 
participating in the exchange, representing a sizeable 
portion of the state’s healthcare community. 
 
3.1. Method  
 
This was not an a priori study of the tension 
between sharing and protecting data.  Rather it was an 
exploratory study to understand the role of security 
policy development in the success of an HIE.  
Therefore, a qualitative research approach was 
employed because it provided the flexibility necessary 
to pursue emergent avenues of inquiry as data 
collection progressed [24]. 
Arrangements for data collection were coordinated 
through the HIE’s executive director, who was known 
to one of the authors.  Pursuant to the goals of the 
study, the executive director arranged meetings or 
provided contact information for everyone still with 
the organization or still available for contact who had 
participated in the HIE’s information security policy 
development process at one point or another.  Within 
that scope of access, semi-structured interviews were 
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conducted, either in person or over the phone, with the 
executive director, five other HIE staff members and 
an external consultant.   
In qualitative research, semi-structured interviews 
help guide the participants in sharing their accounts of 
events and processes that are relevant to the research 
focus, while enabling the researcher to follow new 
lines of inquiry as the incoming data suggests.  
Therefore, while the initial questions were structured 
to the extent that they focused the conversation on the 
security policy development process, subsequent 
questions were adapted to pursue emerging ideas both 
within specific interviews and in subsequent 
interviews [24].  Interviews took place over a four 
month period in 2015 and were conducted by one or 
more of the authors.  All interviews were audio-
recorded with the exception of one in which the 
participant asked not to be recorded.  Documentation 
was also collected and analyzed including the different 
versions of the security policy, policy development 
timelines, and the document deliverables at each stage 
of the policy development process. 
Analysis of the data started after the initial 
interview and continued through the completion of 
data collection.  Interview transcripts and document 
data were analyzed at different points by all of the 
authors in an iterative process of data reduction and 
conclusion drawing [25] with the goal of identifying 
elements of the information security development 
process that explained how the HIE had been 
successful in developing and growing the exchange.  
Through this process we identified the tension 
between sharing and protecting data that the HIE had 
to address through the development, implementation, 
and revision of their information security policies.  
The following account details that iterative process. 
 
3.2. HIE security policy development 
 
WesternHIE has gone through three distinct 
iterations of information security policy development 
since the organization was created in 2011. 
 
3.2.1. First iteration. WesternHIE was created by the 
state’s Quality Improvement Organization (QIO).  The 
QIO had been approached by several individuals from 
the state’s healthcare community to take the lead in 
setting up an HIE for the state.  They agreed, but 
quickly decided to spin off the HIE both to avoid a 
conflict of interest, and to generate buy-in from the 
community because it required them to ask the 
community for board members for the HIE. 
 
“What better way to get buy-in then to reach 
out to our community and say, look, we need 
board members.  You’re going to help shape 
and move technology within the state.” (HIT 
Director) 
 
  The WestermHIE board contracts with the QIO to 
operationalize the exchange that includes a 
management contract, which means that WesternHIE 
has no employees, they are instead employees of the 
QIO.  One result of this arrangement is that 
WesternHIE does not have a dedicated Information 
Security Officer (ISO), but instead makes use of the 
QIO’s ISO as necessary.  This had implications for the 
information security policy development process at 
WesternHIE. 
WesternHIE’s HIT Director said that most HIEs 
would set up their governance structure first and then 
select a vendor to provide the hardware and software 
for the exchange.   
 
“Most HIE’s would establish their governance 
structure and organizational structure and 
then go through a vendor selection … We did 
not do that.  We made a conscious decision to 
run two parallel paths.  One is governance and 
how do we set up the infrastructure.  The 
second was … we wanted to put the vendor in 
place and start getting out to show physicians 
that this could actually work.” (HIT Director) 
 
That created crossover in WesternHIE’s startup 
processes because they needed certain things in place 
to operationalize the HIE (e.g., privacy and security 
policies).  Therefore, in the summer of 2011, eight task 
forces were established by the WesternHIE board of 
directors to develop a plan for the major components 
of the HIE (e.g., Privacy and Security and Data Use 
Agreement Task Force, Financial Sustainability Task 
Force,  Governance and Outreach Task Force, etc.).   
The task-force development process was co-
facilitated by the WesternHIE executive director, and 
an external consultant who served as the expert on 
Federal policy.  The task forces comprised 
WesternHIE staff as well as members of the 
community (e.g., the privacy and security task force 
comprised 13 members that included a hospital 
privacy officer who was also an attorney, the director 
of health information management at another hospital, 
the general counsel for a third hospital, a state 
Medicaid administrator, the corporate compliance 
manager for a large physician’s group, ...)  The 
diversity of participants was both a benefit and a 
challenge because, while multiple perspectives 
produced a greater range of ideas, each participant also 
had to consider other perspectives and think more 
broadly [7, 9]. 
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The task forces met once in July 2011 and twice in 
August to discuss their area of focus and develop a 
recommendation for how WesternHIE should 
proceed.  The privacy and security policy 
recommendations were driven by the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, Security Rule, and Breach and Notification 
Rule.  There were 42 HIPAA standards which needed 
to be examined and addressed in the developed 
policies.  For example, the preamble to the HIPAA 
Final Rule specifically defines an HIE as a Business 
Associate of a Covered Entity. Therefore, the policies 
had to be developed keeping that structure in mind. 
 
“What I always go back to is, what is the Rule? 
What is the Privacy Rule? What is the Security 
Rule? … and we mapped standard by 
standard.” (External Consultant) 
 
In this early stage of the HIE, the tension between 
protecting and sharing data was evident.  There was 
the goal of getting the technology up and running to 
quickly generate buy-in from physicians that an 
exchange could work, while at the same time the 
privacy and security task force recognized the need to 
create security policies based on HIPAA regulations to 
protect the data that would be exchanged.  Both 
exposure and ethical control reasoning were employed 
in the parallel paths of setting up the governance 
structure for the HIE and getting the exchange running 
as a proof of concept for providers. 
However, the consultant worried that the ethical 
reasoning over-excluded both utilitarian reasoning and 
exposure reasoning.  In other words, the aim to seclude 
was unnecessarily eclipsing the (more strategic) aim to 
expose or share.  For example, she noted that with 
regard to HIPAA compliance by HIE participants, 
 
“Many of the hospitals in particular may have 
developed policies that are more strict than 
HIPAA … and that can often become a problem 
because the point of the HIE is to share the 
information and share the data in a secure way, 
but also you don’t want to put up roadblocks to 
having providers and others being able to 
access information when they need it.” 
(External Consultant) 
 
She was not only conditioning the ethical 
reasoning, that is, filtering a dominant deontological 
reasoning with a utilitarian lens. She was also 
reasoning about acceptable levels of exposure.  For 
example, there was a recognition that all participants 
in an HIE together comprised a collective “weak-link 
phenomenon”.  When one participant suffers a data 
breach, all participants would suffer [26]. 
 
“I initially put together several examples of 
data use agreements, because, especially in an 
HIE, it’s very important to have an agreement 
that goes beyond a business associate 
agreement so the HIE has clear written 
relationships with their providers that are part 
of the HIE [so] each of those providers is 
meeting their obligations to the HIE.” 
(External Consultant) 
 
Each task force generated a report for their focus 
area.  These were provided to the external consultant 
in September for aggregation into a full report to the 
WesternHIE board of directors.  The final report 
generated by the external consultant was completed 
and submitted to the board in October 2011 and 
represented a roadmap for how to proceed in building 
out the HIE.  WesternHIE then took that roadmap and 
began developing the organizational structures to 
achieve the goals of the roadmap.  For privacy and 
security that meant constructing the actual policies and 
procedures. 
There was a defined end-date for the initial task 
forces, but WesternHIE subsequently set up two new 
task forces, one for patient consent, which has since 
been twilighted and policies were written out of it, and 
one for compliance and audit, which is an ongoing 
group.  The compliance and audit group is an advisory 
group set up by the board to make sure WesternHIE is 
doing audits appropriately and provide advice on what 
to do in regard to actionable items.  The compliance 
and audit group is the only community group still in 
place, but WesternHIE also have an internal policy 
committee that meets a couple of times each month. 
The initial set of privacy and security policies were 
written by WesternHIE staff based on the roadmap 
constructed by the Privacy and Security and Data Use 
Agreement Task Force.  At this point, the reasoning 
shifted from predominantly one of seclusion which 
was deontological in nature to a more utilitarian focus.  
The HIT director noted that writing a policy is easy, 
but getting staff buy-in is difficult.   
 
“Inevitably you get the GM nod from a lot of 
staff and then they go back to doing what they 
have typically done in the past…. How do you 
take a policy and make it part of the culture?” 
(HIT Director) 
 
Certain policies also had a more utilitarian focus 
with regard to the participant’s needs because the 
participants would be most impacted by those 
particular policies.  The consent policy was one in 
which the participants would be responsible for 
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gaining consent from patients and therefore the policy 
development process took more input from 
participants. 
 
“We met once a month for six months to bring 
the community back together to say, okay, 
you’re going to be the ones getting the 
consents.  Where would this fit in the doctor’s 
office?  How would you go about this?  What 
would the flow be?  Developing the policy for 
that, developing the form, developing the fact 
sheet that you give to somebody.” (Executive 
Director) 
 
At this point, the information security officer, 
because of the relationship noted earlier, had not been 
directly involved in the development of the 
information security policies for WesternHIE. 
 
3.2.2. Second iteration. In 2013 WesternHIE decided 
they needed some expert help to evaluate their existing 
policies and the information security officer (ISO) 
offered to take charge of that process, which kicked off 
on September 9, 2013. 
 
“We needed more [policies], we needed to 
make sure what we had was correct … we 
wanted some confirmation, some validation 
about what we had done because he’s the 
expert.” (Executive Director) 
 
  In addition to the ISO, there were two other 
WesternHIE staff members on the core evaluation 
team along with a four-member project steering 
committee that included the ISO.  The ISO’s plan was 
to assess WesternHIE’s security posture using NIST 
guidelines [32] for the evaluation, but he also looked 
to outside sources to see what other HIE’s around the 
country were doing.  He felt the evaluation process at 
WesternHIE was not as well-defined and structured as 
he had experienced in other contexts and that the 
participants were often distracted with other tasks and 
did not put enough value on the evaluation process.  
He also felt there was a limited awareness by the staff 
on how to carry out the process, so he had to spend 
time educating the other participants on how to 
properly conduct the evaluation.  
There is a growing presence of exposure control 
reasoning as the need for evaluation rises.  There is 
also an introduction of NIST guidelines as a driver of 
deontological reasoning to balance the early focus on 
HIPAA rules.  Concerns that reflect exposure control 
reasoning include worries that someone could hack a 
partner organization in the HIE and use it as a 
backdoor to compromise other partners.  In order to 
overcome this risk exposure, all partners will need to 
be strong, and their relationships need to be good 
enough to maintain a high level of security for the HIE. 
The evaluation included a gap assessment where 
HIPAA required/best practice privacy and security 
policies were compared with WesternHIE’s existing 
policies.  For example, the policy on permitted use and 
disclosure existed, but it was considered “thin” and 
therefore the team concluded that it should be updated 
to reflect the HIPAA Final Rule of 2013, while the 
policy on receiving and resolving complaints and or 
concerns did not exist, and therefore the team 
concluded that a policy and procedures should be 
developed using the best practice example. The 
evaluation process lasted four weeks and was 
completed on October 3, 2013 which then led to a 
period of policy writing and revising. 
 
3.2.3. Third iteration. In late 2014, another round of 
policy evaluation took place, but this time the ISO was 
not involved in the process and it was primarily carried 
out by a new set of staff members who were not 
involved in the 2013 evaluation. 
 
“Here’s an area where we could use some 
extra eyes and ears.  We need to update, we 
need to review these [privacy and security 
policies].” (Executive Director) 
 
  At that point, WesternHIE had 60+ privacy and 
security policies, many of which had been added as a 
result of the 2013 evaluation.  The evaluation team 
started by prioritizing the policies and removing those 
that were specific to certain procedures, which helped 
to reduce the scope of their work.  They also found that 
many were written from the perspective of a covered 
entity.  The HIE is not a covered entity, but is instead 
a business associate of participating covered entities. 
Therefore policies that focused on the HIE as a 
covered entity, could also be eliminated.  Finally, 
because of their relationship to the QIO, they found 
that many of the policies were part of the QIO’s 
policies that WesternHIE could use indirectly.  
Therefore, the ISO had indirect involvement in the 
process because he had authored many of the QIO 
policies that were used in whole or in part by 
WesternHIE.  In addition, they found that there was 
significant variation in how the policies were 
structured, so they developed a standard template with 
clear instructions and examples for future policy 
writers.  The template was based on the experience that 
some of the team members had with policy writing in 
other organizations. 
The decision to develop and implement a policy 
template reflected ethical control reasoning with a 
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utilitarian focus because the goal was not to reanalyze 
the policies from the perspective of threats and assets 
but to make the policies easier to read and use by 
participants. Policy drafting started with the 
assignment of a policy owner who could be the person 
who identified the need or another person in that 
functional area.  The owner of a policy was responsible 
for writing the policy and the template made that 
responsibility much less daunting.  The revised 
policies were then sent out to the HIE participants for 
review.  Participants had 45 days to review the policy 
and submit questions. 
 
“We do send these policies out after they are 
approved [by the compliance and audit 
committee].  We look for feedback, is there 
anything we overlooked or that would be a 
concern to them as participants?” (Policy 
Intern) 
 
This also reflects a focus on ethical controls 
reasoning with a utilitarian goal of understanding the 
needs of participants and incorporating those needs, as 
appropriate, into the policies.  They originally 
anticipated that the process would take 2-3 months but 
it ended up taking a year to complete.  In the end, the 
policies were reduced from 60+ to 14. 
Through this process of developing, implementing, 
and revising the HIE’s information security policies 
the list of participant organization’s continued to grow 
and currently includes as active members of the HIE: 
62 physician offices, 9 acute care hospitals, 7 
diagnostic services, and 1 health plan.  With that many 
participants, each of which is ultimately responsible 
for the health information they share through the 
exchange, agreement and compliance with the HIE’s 
information security policies has not been 
homogeneous, but the HIE contends that the general 
perception and engagement with the process and the 
resulting policies has been very positive both from 
active participants and the community at large.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
In order to evaluate our theoretical framework, we 
analyzed the tension between sharing and protecting 
health data on WesternHIE’s information security 
policy development process.  For this, we considered 
the ways in which exposure and ethical control 
reasoning were utilized by the members of the HIE to 
develop their information security policies and 
assessed how those two forms of reasoning interacted 
in the policy development process. 
Exposure control reasoning is concerned with the 
implementation of controls to separate assets from 
their associated threats.  For WesternHIE this started 
with an analysis of the assets and threats that would be 
relevant to an HIE.  In creating the initial task force for 
privacy and security, WesternHIE’s decision to 
include participants from the healthcare and legal 
domains was predicated on the belief that diversity 
would produce a range of perspectives to better 
identify the relevant assets and threats for which 
controls would need to be defined in the information 
security policies. 
The second iteration of WesternHIE’s information 
security policies was initiated on the belief that the 
expertise of the information security officer could help 
identify gaps in the assets and threats for which the 
policies were written.  Here the tension between 
sharing and protecting was most pronounced as the 
ISO was focused on protection while the other 
members of the HIE were more focused on enabling 
their participants to exchange data with fewer 
restrictions.  The result of that assessment and revision 
was the expansion of the information security policies 
to include controls for additional assets and threats 
identified by the ISO. 
The third iteration, which did not involve the ISO 
directly, was focused on refining and consolidating the 
organization’s policies by applying a uniform template 
to all policies and eliminating those that were focused 
too narrowly on specific procedures or roles.  The 
belief was that a high number of policies in non-
standard formats would not be effective as a 
mechanism for securing information assets because 
the policies would be less likely to be read and applied.  
In other words, reasoning focused too heavily on 
exposure control can lead to a set of policies that 
appear to provide comprehensive guidance on the 
implementation of controls to protect organizational 
assets from security threats, but run the risk of being 
rarely consulted and therefore ineffective. 
Ethical control reasoning is concerned with the 
rational for how decisions are made regarding 
information security controls.  When WesternHIE was 
created the organization was deliberately set up to 
include board members from the healthcare 
community and taskforces were created that included 
a diversity of members from the healthcare 
community.  This represents a focus on utilitarian 
reasoning in which the goal was to form a group that 
would be best positions to determine how the HIE 
should be built to facilitate the greatest good for the 
community in which it would operate.  In addition, an 
external consultant was brought in to serve as an 
expert on the legal requirements for HIE, which 
represents a focus on deontological reasoning to make 
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sure the HIE was going to be compliant with federal 
law, specifically HIPAA and state law. 
In the second iteration, the information security 
officer chose to assess the information security 
policies using NIST guidelines for evaluation and 
followed a structured approach that would produce a 
more rigorous and complete set of policies.  He was 
concerned that the system connections between the 
HIE and the QIO would allow someone to hack into 
the HIE and use it as a backdoor into the QIO.  
Therefore, a weak HIE was a vulnerability for the QIO 
for which he was responsible.  Consequently, the 
ethical control reasoning of the ISO was focused 
primarily on a utilitarian perspective of what was best 
for the QIO. 
The third iteration relied more heavily on 
deontological reasoning as the HIE staff strove to 
work with participants to formulate policies that would 
work for them.  The consent policy was an example of 
this where the participants would be the ones engaging 
in consent activities so they were consulted more 
directly on the consent policy and forms.  The goal was 
to produce a set of policies that were more accessible 
to both HIE staff and participants. 
For WesternHIE the tension between sharing and 
protection in the development of information security 
policies was always present, but the reasoning applied 
to manage that tension shifted from one iteration to the 
next.  The first iteration was probably the most 
balanced in terms of how exposure and ethical control 
reasoning was applied to the policy development 
process as the privacy and security task force 
constructed a roadmap for the HIE’s initial round of 
policy development.  The second iteration was much 
more focused on exposure control reasoning as the 
ISO attempted to bring more rigor and a stronger 
security focus to the policy development process.  The 
third iteration shifted to ethical control reasoning as 
the HIE staff saw the number of policies and their non-
standardized structure as impediments to the use of 
those policies by staff and participants and a hindrance 
to participants in the use of the HIE. 
This framework therefore suggests that as 
organizations develop their information security 
policies and more generally consider their information 
security program, both exposure and ethical control 
reasoning are necessary to balance the tension between 
protecting and sharing information. This means that 
focusing on one type of reasoning over the other, while 
not necessarily a problem, will shift the focus of the 
tension to either sharing or protection. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The exchange of health information between 
providers is considered critical to the improvement of 
healthcare both in better care quality and cost 
reduction.  To increase participation in health 
information exchange and sustain that participation 
over time, healthcare organizations and individual 
consumers must feel confident that the information 
shared and accessed through the exchange is secure 
and private. The inherent tension in this process 
between the need to share and desire to protect health 
information has impacted the achievement of greater 
interoperability. 
We introduce a theory of information security 
control that considers the development of an 
information security policy, as a foundational and 
fundamental process in information security, through 
the relationship between exposure control reasoning 
and ethical control reasoning.  We find that these two 
forms of reasoning can be used to balance the tension 
between sharing and protecting information and that 
an effective information security policy development 
process that brings together stakeholders, experts, and 
prior codified knowledge, can provide an important 
foundation for a successful HIE. 
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